

International Institute for Counter-Terrorism With the Support of Keren Daniel



Terrorism and Radicalization in Prisons An International High Level Conference

ISRAEL 2018





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
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

































...a challenge that goes beyond national borders, that requires collective efforts across Member States, at different levels of government, and through agencies and different sectors. **J**

- Dimitris Avramopoulos







Mein Kampf 2011

Adolf Sitter

Bwei Bande in einem Band Ungefürzte Ausgabe

Eine Abrechnung

Iweller Band: Die nationalsozialistische Bewegung

534.-532. Auflage

40

Bentralverlag der RODAD., Frs. Cher Rachi., Ombo.

19

Cray Killer,







Prisons played an **enormous role in the narratives of radical and militant movements** in the modern period...



... imprisonment was a traumatic turning point in the histories of their movements.

















USA Patriot Act

"On October 26, 2001, President George W. Bush signs the Patrict of an an terrorism law drawn up in response to the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.

The USA PATRIOT Act, as it is officially known, is an acronym for "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercent and Obstruct Terrorism." Bush hoped the bipartisan legislation would empower law enforcement and intelligence agencies to prevent future terrorist attacks on American soil.

PATRIOT

The law was intended, in Bush's words, to "enhance the penalties that will fall on terrorists or anyone who helps them." The act increased intelligence agencies' ability to share information and lifted restrictions on communications surveillance. Law enforcement officials were given broader mandates to fight financial counterfeiting, smuggling and money laundering schemes that funded terrorists. The Patriot Act's expanded definition of terrorism also gave the FBI increased powers to access personal information such as medical and financial records. The Patriot Act superseded all state laws."

-HistoryChannel.com

AVERY



Hold on... Yes. In Europe we are different! Aren't we?

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We all read Kafka, Orwell, Bentham and Foucault and understand the concepts of the "society of control"...

...we're different... aren't we?





There are more than 50.000 radicals in Europe. "We do not have exact numbers, but it is not difficult to make some rough calculations. The UK has 25.000. France has 17.000. Spain has less, but we assume around 5000. From **Belgium more than 500 persons travelled to** fight in Syria and we calculate around 2000 radicals in the country. I would not risk a concrete number but they are thousands, more than 50.000."

More than 5.000 foreign fighters from Europe "There is a certain consensus that the number of foreign fighters that travelled from Europe are more than 5000. From these, 1/3 returned home and less than 1/3 died in combat".






Guilles de Kerchove. Coordinator of European Counter Terrorism "What happened in Barcelona will be repeated. There are more than 50.000 radicals in Europe.".


El Mundo 31.08.2017.


Foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq

Estimates and analysis from the London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation









RADICALISATION PREVENTION IN PRISONS

MULTI-LEVEL IN-PRISON RADICALISATION PREVENTION CERTIFICATION RRAP - RADICALISATION RISK ASSESSMENT IN PRISONS TOOLSET R2PRIS ONLINE TRAINING SOLUTIONS




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www.r2pris.org

Radicalisation Prevention in Prisons (R2pris) project seeks to reduce radicalisation and extremism inside prisons by enhancing the competences of frontline staff (correctional officers, educational staff and psychologists, social workers) to identify, report and interpret signals of radicalisation and respond appropriately.

- 1. Create awareness on the broad picture of radicalisation
- **2. Develop the tools and instruments** for prison administration and line-level staff to recognize signs of radicalisation
- 3. Provide instruments to help staff report their observations to the appropriate intelligence staff
- **4. Establish training programmes and tools for all staff** within a prison to respond to potential vulnerable individuals at risk of radicalisation.



R2PRIS RADICALISATION PREVENTION IN PRISONS



Partnership

Associated partners:



Schweizerisches Ausbildungszentrum für das Strafvollzugspersonal SAZ Centre suisse de formation pour le personnel pénitentiaire CSFPP Centro svizzero per la formazione del personale penitenziario CSFPP







R2PRIS Outputs

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Training programme

Training course E-learning course Train the trainer course




Methodological fpamewogkde-radicalisation and prevention of radicalisation strategies within 1 3 prisons Handbook and online repository 2 4 of "best" practices on radicalisation The Radicalisation Risk Assessment prevention in prisons in Prisons (RRAP Tool Set) + **CIRA Critical Incidents Readiness** Assessment





What is behind radicalisation in prisons?







phase 1 pre-radicalisation personal factors

Most inmates begin their incarceration with no particularly strong religious or ideological affiliation. However, some characteristics make them potentially susceptible and vulnerable to radicalisation (personal factors) namely:

- 1. history of violent behaviour;
 - 2. anti-social attitudes;
 - personal crisis and low self-esteem;

4. a small proportion suffers from mental health disorders; sense of victimisation; feelings of compromised identity and alienation; 7. need to belong to an empowering religion/ideology, 8. seek to wipe away previous criminal deeds; 9. spiritual seeking; 10. need an external entity to blame for their personal problems; **11.** political grievances; 12. physical protection.



phase 2 situational/contextual factors and enablers

Situational/contextual factors and enablers facilitate the progression of vulnerable individuals in the radicalisation process into violent extremism. Those factors can be:

 presence of extremist social networks, that provide protection and social support;

- 2. presence of extremist ideologies;
- 3. presence of charismatic inmate leaders;

- presence of extremist prison chaplains;
- outreach programs by external extremist organisations;
- presence of terrorist "kingpins";
- 7. "virtual" presence by terrorist

organisations.

E 3 ► 1



phase 3 self-identification

In self-identification is likely to occur and those vulnerable individuals under the influence of situational/contextual factors, begin to:

1. explore extremist ideologies/religions.

2. gravitate away from their identities.

3. associate themselves with like-minded extremists and adopt their ideology.

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phase 4 indoctrination

Indoctrination is the next step:

 intensification of prisoner's extremist beliefs;
 follower/discipleship under extremist "indoctrinators".





phase 5 militancy

where indoctrinated prisoners:

- adopt extremist ideology calling for violence against adversaries;
 - self-designate themselves as "warriors";
- plan to conduct a terrorist attack after their release.







phase 6 post-prison release terrorism

occurs, and radicalised individuals:

 join an extremist "gateway" organisation;
 join a terrorist cell;
 plan to conduct a terrorist attack after their release.



phase 7 post-attack re-incarceration

-

takes place, if the extremist is not killed in the terrorist attack and is apprehended.



The R2pris methodological framework concludes that prison radicalisation is likely to be influenced by 3-level factors:

Assessing the risk associated with factors related to PRISON SERVICE/ENVIRONMENT

- Prison polices regarding the assessment at entrace, the management and the placement of extremist prisoners
- Degree of under-staffing
- Degree of over-crowding
- Prison staff's ability to recognize and deal with signals of radicalisation
- Presence of cruel, inhuman, and degrading conditions of confinement
- Degree of cooperation between prison service and police and intelligences services
 - Assessing the risk associated with factors present AMONG PRISONERS
- Presence of extremist social networks, such as religious-based gangs
- Presence of terrorist "kingpins"
- Presence of extremist religions/ideologies
- Presence of extremist prison chaplains
- Presence of charismatic extremist inmate leaders
- "Virtual" presence by terrorist organizations
- Presence of outreach programs by external extremist organizations

Identifying VULNERABLE PRISONERS at risk of becoming radicalised

- Conversion
- Recruitment

R2PRIS Methodological Framework






Methodological framework



And recommends a 4-step approach towards effective analysis of radicalisation processes within prisons:


- Step 1 Assessing the risk associated with factors related to prison service
- Step 2 Assessing the risk associated with factors present among inmates
- Step 3 Identifying vulnerable inmates at risk of becoming radicalised
- Step 4 Analysing the coexistence of / and interaction between these factors





The Radicalisation Risk Assessment in Prisons (RRAP Tool Set)







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
The Radicalisation Risk Assessment in Prisons (RRAP Tool Set)

The RRAP approach

The RRAP Tool Set suggests a **structured professional judgement (SPJ) approach** where:

- the professional is systematically guided
- the professional has to decide about the presence and absence of risk factors
- the risk level is judged by a decision maker, using different categories of risk/needs for intervention

The tools provide the basis for further interventions. Prison systems can adapt interventions based on the assessment.



R2PRIS RADICALISATION PREVENTION



The Radicalisation Risk Assessment in Prisons (RRAP Tool Set)



2.1 Helicopter View



HV Helicopter View: Assessing situational risk factors The facilitator's guide



Objectives:

- Raise the awareness of prison governors/prison system administrators regarding
 radicalisation in prisons and to support the assessment of the first two (situational) dimensions:
 factors related to prison/prison service and those present among inmates
- Identify the strategies and action
 plans to implement





The Radicalisation Risk Assessment in Prisons (RRAP Tool Set)



2.1 Helicopter View

The response scale comprises two dimensions:

- **Probability** probability of ٠ existing/happening and creating a problem.
- **Consequence** how serious will ۲ the consequences be, how urgent do we need to deal with it.

| | What is th | Consequence How serious will the consequences be, how urgent do we need to deal with it? | | | | | |
|---|-----------------------|---|--------------------------|----------------------|--|----|----------------------|
| Insert factors that need to be assessed (sub-questions) | 1 Less probable | | 4 High probability | 1 Less serious | | | 4 Very serious |
| Q1.1.E.g. access to information about inmates prior history of extremist actions | | R | | | | Ŧ. | |
| Q1.2. | | | | | | | |
| Q1.3. | | | | | | | |
| Q1.4. | | | | | | | |
| Add as many lines as needed | | | | | | | |



The Radicalisation Risk Assessment in Prisons (RRAP Tool Set)



Q1. Prison policies regarding the assessment at entrance, the management and the placement of violent extremist prisoners.

In order to prevent them to radicalise and recruit other prisoners to their cause, violent extremist offenders must be first identified and then placed and managed appropriately.


| | What is th | Proba e probability o creating a | | Consequence How serious will the consequences be, how urgent do we need to deal with it? | | | | |
|---|-----------------------|---|---|---|----------------------|--|----|----------------------|
| Insert factors that need to be assessed (sub-questions) | 1 Less probable | | | 4 High probability | 1 Less serious | | | 4 Very serious |
| Q1.1.E.g. access to information about inmates prior history of extremist actions | | | R | | | | Η. | |
| Q1.2. | | | | | | | | |
| Q1.3. | | | | | | | | |
| Q1.4. | | | | | | | | |
| Add as many lines as needed | | | | | | | | |

What does this factor mean?

- Do we have information about prisoners prior extremist violent actions (even though they may not have been convicted for crimes related to these? Do we have access to the information we need (medical information, network, historic events, police records etc.)?
- Are we mapping? Is the mapping good in the sense that it is done by the people who has the right position, the right skills and have the right knowledge to know what they are looking for? Do we have the tools we need (forms, software etc.)? Do we have the time to do this? Are we using the information the mapping gives us?
- Is the information shared with the right people? How do we communicate about risk found in the mapping? Do the people who make the decisions know of this information and is it available for them, and are they using it?
- Is the information updated when there are changes?
- Are we thinking of mapping and placement only at entrance?

Keywords for discussion:

Mapping; Placement; Information Access; Up-to-date Information; Communication.






The Radicalisation Risk Assessment in Prisons (RRAP Tool Set)



2.2 Frontline Behavioural Observation Guidelines



- It is targeted at frontline staff (i.e.: prison officers, educators, teachers, social workers, etc.) and describes behaviours/changes in behaviours that can represent the externalisation of cognitive radicalisation in inmates
- The checklist may change from country to country giving the cultural background, prison context/dynamics, etc.





The Radicalisation Risk Assessment in Prisons (RRAP Tool Set)

2.2 Frontline Behavioural Observation Guidelines

- A list of possible observable behaviours is provided for the construction of the final checklist
- This list **must be validated by frontline staff** and upgraded with contributions according to their experience
- The list has space to add the date and notes of the observed behaviours

Focusing on:

- 1. Inmate's physical appearance
- 2. Decoration of the cell and objects in its possession
- 3. Daily routines
- 4. Way of relating to other inmates, prison staff, relatives and others
- 5. Speech

4. Way of relating to other inmates, prison staff, relatives and others Give some examples of changes in his/her way of relating to people (other inmates, prison staff, family and friends who visit him/her) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Example: - Starts trying/intending to establish a connection with terrorist leaders or radical kingpins (guidance): - Starts imitating the behaviour/attitude of a certain terrorist leader or radical kingpin; - Starts giving/getting presents from terrorist leaders or radical kingpins; - Starts rejecting contact and does not talk to woman, even if she is a prison officer; - Sees himself/herself as being superior to others; Changed his/her name; - Begins to have an arrogant attitude and tends to discriminate others; - Other inmates cannot talk directly to him/her. In order to send them a message or communicate, they have to talk to inmates who were "selected" by him/her;

- Establishes a hierarchy/internal rules that other inmates should respect and obey;
- Is strongly biased (racist, homophobic, etc.);
- Starts refusing to cohabit with non-Muslims inmates in his/her cell;
- Begins to isolate himself/herself from other inmates/prison staff;
- Moves away from his family or old friends (ex: stops making phone calls, does not receive visitors);
- Begins to relate to people identified as being registered in terrorist networks; ...




The Radicalisation Risk Assessment in Prisons (RRAP Tool Set)

2.3 Individual Radicalisation Screening

- It is targeted at technical staff, mainly psychologists or staff training in the use of psychologic assessments (advanced degree in the social, medical, or behavioural sciences; experience with forensic populations).
- Focus on cognitive radicalisation
- Comprehends questions regarding previously identified dimensions of inmate radicalisation risk (<u>9</u> dimensions – <u>39</u> items):


• Also considers protective items

(ex. Family support for non-violence; Involvement with non-violent, de-radicalisation, offence related programmes)





The Radicalisation Risk Assessment in Prisons (RRAP Tool Set)



An iterative process that requires **interviewing the** inmate, observation, interaction with other professionals (e.g, frontline staff), and the check of available information (from other assessment tools from the psychiatric and psychological domains, to the prison records available that provide behavioral information about the inmate being assessed).

The professional should **avoid the "I don't have** this information" option and search for available information.



IN-GROUP

IDENTITY FUSION

IDENTIFICATION


Radical belief

RADICALISM

DISTANCE AND DISCONNECTION

system

Pre-Radicalisation personal factors






The Radicalisation Risk Assessment in Prisons (RRAP Tool Set)



Radical Belief System






The Radicalisation Risk Assessment in Prisons (RRAP Tool Set)

2.3 Individual Radicalisation Screening


- Every answer must be supported by evidence (the form includes space to register justifications/evidence of the answer)
- Training and access to the coding and conversion sheet is provided to the respondent. This sheet helps converting the (qualitative) answer to a number.
- The risk scale is automatically calculated automatically through the online tool, as well as a global score for each individual.







The analysis of the different dimensions suggests that the inmate **may/may not be** in a certain stage of the radicalisation process.



Self-Identification with extreme ideology the inmate is starting to explore extremist ideologies, distancing himself/herself from old identities, rejecting the norms and values of the country he/she lives in.

Indoctrination the inmate is reinforcing its extremist beliefs, while contacting with extremist leaders or materials that are indoctrinating him/her into the extremist ideology.

Militancy the inmate already adopted an extremist political or religious ideology, is fully indoctrinated into that ideology, and fells the duty to actively defend or fight for the cause. The inmates sees terrorism and violent actions as an acceptable mean to pursue political/religious goals.

Radicalisation Screening Technical Assessment



Response form

| Name of the inmate: | |
|---|--|
| Number: | |
| Respondent (person filling the instrument): | |

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
Yes

No

I've been trained in the use of this instrument, read carefully its advantages, limitations and instructions of use.

| | | Never | Almost Never | Sometimes | Almost Always | Always | I don't have this information | Protective Item [1] |
|---------|---|-------|-----------------|-----------|------------------|--------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | |
| _ | Need to belong | | | | | | | |
| NB 1 | Has a strong "need to belong" to a political/religious group. | | | | | | | |
| | Comment/Evidence: | | | | | | | |
| NB 2 | Worries about whether other people care about him/her. | | | | Red Black | | | |
| | Comment/Evidence: | | | | | | | |
| NB 3 | Wants other people to accept him/her. | | | 40408 | | | | |
| | Comment/Evidence: | | | | | | | |
| NB 4 | Tries hard not to do things that will make other people avoid or reject him/her. | | | | | | | |
| | Comment/Evidence: | | | | | | | |
| NB 5 | Gets angry when he/she is not included in other people's plans. | | | | | | | |
| | Comment/Evidence: | | | | | | | |

Radicalisation Screening Technical Assessment



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(PLEASE DO NOT WRITE ON THIS SHEET)

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| | Consider the protective factors positive or negative impact on inmates' strenght/vulnerability to become radicalised. | | Consider the demographic items positive or negative impact on inmates' strenght/vulnerability to become radicalised. | |

| Pre-radicalisation | |
|----------------------|--|
| Vulnerability 3,8 | |
| | able inmate is an inmate with a good (birds cell acteem, emotional stability, that doors?) have a strong |

Low vulnerability – a low vulnerable inmate is an inmate with a good/high self-esteem, emotional stability, that doesn't have a strong need to belong to some empowering political/religious ideology and group. Additionally, this inmates keeps a strong relationship with prosocial friends and family.


Moderate vulnerability – a moderately vulnerable inmate is typically someone with some degree of emotional instability, low self-esteem and a moderate need to belong to an empowering political/religious ideology and group. This inmate can still have some sort of links with non-radicalised friends and family.

High vulnerability – a high vulnerable inmate is an inmate with low self-esteem, highly instable in terms of behaviour and emotions, with a strong need to belong to an empowering political/religious ideology and group. This need to belong led him/her to some form of activism, supporting radical organizations. Additionally, this inmates can maintain connections with radicalised friends or family.

Vulnerability



Radicalisation Stage



The R2pris project is co-financed by ERASMUS + programme (KA2 - Strategic Partnerships for adult education). ERASMUS + is the new EU programme for Education, Training, Youth, and Sport (2014-2020). Erasmus+

Changing lives. Opening minds

EUROPE • 1 hour ago

Suspect accused of killing 3, including 2 cops, in Belgium mentioned in radicalization reports







Trending in World



Anti-Kremlin Russian journalist shot and killed in Ukraine





CIRA Critical Incidents Readiness Assessment





CIRA Critical Incidents Readiness Assessment The facilitator's guide



Assessing the prison readiness to deal with major threats

Supports the prison governor and prison management team to reflect and assess its readiness to contend with a major security emergency, providing a framework for a thorough review of important issues.





CIRA Critical Incidents Readiness Assessment


| Institu | ition: |
|---------|---------|
| Team | leader: |

Department: Assessment team:

Dimensions

| 1. Consideration of Security Threat Strategies | | icable | Probability What is the probability of existing/happening and creating a problem? | | | Consequence How serious will the consequences be, how urgent do we need to deal with it? | | | lences be, | |
|---|-----|--------|---|--|--|---|----------------------|--|------------|----------------------|
| Insert factors that need to be assessed (sub-questions) | Yes | No | 1 Less probable | | | 4 High probability | 1 Less serious | | | 4 Very serious |
| Q1.1. Has the institution planned for the possibility that it might be targeted for a security threat? | | | | | | | | | | |
| Q1.2. Has the institution planned for and analysed the possibility of being targeted for a mass escape (either to create panic or to demonstrate the vulnerability of government controls)? | | | | | | | | | | |
| Q1.3. Has the institution planned for and analysed the potential for an inmate or group of inmates to be recruited for an external organisation to plan or carry out an activity against prison security? | | | | | | | | | | |
| Q1.4. Has the institution planned for and analysed the potential for an inmate or group of inmates to plan or carry out an activity against prison security on its own? | | | | | | | | | | |
| Add as many lines as needed | | | | | | | | | | |






Please write your comments/assessment notes (report from the analysis – summary of discussions) in the text box below:

The training programme

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Aims to increase the understanding of:

- The radicalisation process in prisons
- Tools and procedures for assessing radicalisation risk
- Existing programmes and intervention strategies of radicalisation prevention for prison and probation services





The training programme The e-learning course structure



Module I – Radicalisation in Prisons: Awareness

Chapter 1: What is RadicalisationChapter 2: Pathways to RadicalisationChapter 3: Levels and Mechanisms of RadicalisationChapter 4: Radicalisation in Prisons

Module II – Radicalisation in Prisons Assessment: Tools and Procedures


Chapter 5: Analysing Radicalisation Risk in Prisons
 Chapter 6: Radicalisation Risk Assessment tools: the R2PRIS
 Approach and tool set
 Chapter 7: Dynamic Security and Prison Intelligence

Module III – Radicalisation in Prisons: Programmes and Intervention Strategies

Chapter 8: Intervention Principles and StrategiesChapter 9: Prison Regime ChoicesChapter 10: Exit programmes

Module IV – Critical Incidents readiness assessment

Chapter 11: Critical incidents in prisonsChapter 12: Operational readiness assessmentChapter 13: Intervention strategies







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CHAPTER:

a)



Understand the radicalisation concept and its core characteristics;

- Distinguish the differences between radicalism, terrorism and extremism;
- Recognise the conversion and radicalisation processes;
- Identify the characteristics of violent extremism;
- Comprehend the concept of Islamism and Islamic fundamentalism;
- Understand what are the possible consequences of radicalisation.

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Violent extremism and radicalisation remain a **challenge** to security and the fundamental values that lie at the heart of the European Union.

Commission urges EU countries to fight rise of extremism



Source: EurActiv

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R2PRIS RADICALISATION PREVENTION IN PRISON

R2PRIS

Participants

Badges

Competencies

Grades

- General
- MODULE I Radicalisation in Prisons: Awareness
- MODULE II Radicalisation in Prisons Assessment: Tools and Procedures
- MODULE III Radicalisation in Prisons: Programmes and Intervention Strategies

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MODULE II Radicalisation in Prisons Assessment: Tools and Procedures

- C5 Analysing Radicalisation Risk in Prisons
 - In this Module we will learn about the following subjects:
 - Analysing Radicalisation Risk in Prisons;
 - Radicalisation Risk Assessment tools: The R2PRIS Approach and tool set;
 - The tactical self-audit checklist
 - Use of dynamic security.



By the end of this chapter, you will be able to:

- Know and understand the different tools, its objectives and target users;
- Understand how the tools relate to each other in order to achieve a holistic view regarding radicalisation risk;
- Comprehend the different assessment dimensions of the tools, namely:
- Individual factors;
- Situation contextual factors.
- C6 Radicalisation Risk Assessment tools the R2PRIS Approach and tool set (front line staff)
- By the end of this chapter, you will be able to:
- Know and understand the different tools, its objectives and target users;
- Understand how the tools relate to each other in order to achieve a holistic view regarding radicalisation risk;
- Comprehend the different assessment dimensions of the tools, namely:
- Individual factors;
- Situation contextual factors.
- C6 Radicalisation Risk Assessment tools the R2PRIS Approach and tool set (technical staff)
- By the end of this chapter, you will be able to:
- Know and understand the different tools, its objectives and target users;
- Understand how the tools relate to each other in order to achieve a holistic view regarding radicalisation risk;
- Comprehend the different assessment dimensions of the tools, namely:
- Individual factors;
- Situation contextual factors.
- C7 Dynamic Security and Prison Intelligence
 - By the end of this chapter, you will be able to:
 - Comprehend the dynamic security concepts and its bases:

R2PRIS Training and Certification Events

- Lisbon
- Bucharest
- Brussels
- Lisbon
- Oslo











R2PRIS training manuals







There is no one-size-fits all.

- What works in one case may need to be adjusted in another
- Evaluation of the effectiveness of the existing programmes is needed





R2PRIS RADICALISATION PREVENTION IN PRISONS



MULTI-LEVEL IN-PRISON RADICALISATION PREVENTION THE R2PRIS APPROACH AND CERTIFICATION PROGRAMME

PREVENCIÓN MULTINIVEL DE LA RADICALIZACIÓN EN PRISIÓN EL ENFOQUE Y EL PROGRAMA DE CERTIFICACIÓN R2PRIS

| Tools Instrumentos | <mark>What is it?</mark> ¿Qué es? | Who should attend? ¿Quién debe asistir? | Days of training Días de formación | Follow-up coaching Seguimiento |
|---|--|--|---|---|
| HV Helicopter view Visión general | An organisational risk assessment tool that aims to raise awareness and support prison governors/prison system administrators to reflect and assess situational dimensions in preventing radicalisation - factors related to prison/prison service and those present among inmates – and to identify the strategies and action plans that need to be implemented. Un instrumento de evaluación de riesgos organizativos que tiene como objetivo concienciar y servir de apoyo a los directores de prisiones / administradores de sistemas penitenciarios para que consideren y evalúen las dimensiones situacionales en la prevención de la radicalización (factores relacionados con la prisión/el servicio penitenciario y presentes entre los reclusos) e identifiquen las estrategias y planes de acción que deben implementarse. | Prison administration professionals, Prison Governors, prison service trainers and change facilitators Profesionales de las administraciones penitenciarias, directores de prisiones, formadores de los servicios penitenciarios y facilitadores de cambios | ½ day online training2 days training½ día de formación en línea2 días de formación | ½ dayonline session afterfirst implementationUna sesión de½ día en líneatras la primeraimplementación |
| FBOG Frontline Behavioural Observation Guidelines Pautas de observación del comportamiento en primera línea | An instrument developed to raise awareness about radicalisation in prisons and to support frontline staff (i.e.: prison officers, educators, teachers, social workers, etc.) in signalling behaviours/changes in behaviours that can represent the externalisation of cognitive radicalisation in inmates. Un instrumento desarrollado para concienciar sobre la radicalización en las prisiones y para apoyar al personal de primera línea (es decir, funcionarios de prisiones, educadores, profesores, trabajadores sociales, etc.) en la señalización de comportamientos/cambios de comportamiento que puedan representar la exteriorización de la radicalización cognitiva en los reclusos. | Frontline staff trainers and change facilitators, senior frontline staff Formadores del personal de primera línea y facilitadores de cambios, personal de primera línea especializado | | |

| IRS Individual Radicalisation Screening Identificación de radicalización individual | Provides a broad assessment based on putative risk dimensions that have been identified in the scientific literature as pathways to radicalisation and violent extremism. Considering different behavioural, emotional and cognitive dimensions related to radicalisation, this assessment will provide a more detailed picture about the risks associated with the specific inmate being assessed identifying the level of vulnerability and the radicalisation stage. Proporciona una amplia evaluación basada en las dimensiones de riesgo putativo identificadas en la literatura científica como vías hacia la radicalización y el extremismo violento. Teniendo en cuenta las diferentes dimensiones conductuales, emocionales y cognitivas relacionadas con la radicalización, esta evaluación proporcionará una imagen más detallada de los riesgos asociados con el recluso específico que se está evaluando, identificando el nivel de vulnerabilidad y la fase de radicalización. | Prison staff with holding an advanced degree in the social, medical, or behavioural sciences and experience with forensic populations Personal penitenciario con un título avanzado en ciencias sociales, médicas o conductuales y experiencia con poblaciones forenses | 1 day online training 2 days training 1 día de formación en línea 2 días de formación | Two half day online sessions after first implementation 2 sesiones de ½ día en línea tras la primera implementación |
|---|--|---|---|--|
| CIRA: Critical Incidents Readiness Assessment Evaluación de la preparación para incidentes críticos | SS Assessment Evaluación de la preparación An organisational risk assessment tool to raise awareness about risks and support prison governors/prison system administrators to reflect and assess the prison/prison service readiness to contend with major security emergencies. Un instrumento de evaluación de riesgos organizativos para concienciar sobre los riesgos y servir de apoyo a los directores de prisiones/administradores de sistemas penitenciarios para que consideren y evalúen la preparación de las prisiones/los servicios penitenciarios para hacer frente a las principales emergencias de seguridad. | Prison administration professionals, Prison Governors, heads of security, prison service trainers and change facilitators. Profesionales de la administración penitenciaria, directores de prisiones, jefes de seguridad, formadores de los servicios penitenciarios y facilitadores de cambios. | 1 ⁄₂ day online training 2 days training 1 ∕₂ día de formación en línea 2 días de formación | 1/2 day online session after first implementation Una sesión de 1/2 día en línea tras la primera implementación |

Towards and Integrated Approach to Radicalisation Prevention






Community

The supporting role of the **wider community**, particularly in the oftendifficult transition from prison to release, is vital in the de-radicalisation process. In fact, while the community can act as a powerful and credible support network for former offenders, it can also serve to undo the programmed interventions or 'relationship building' processes done with mentors in the prison.

Family

WayOut Integrated Exit Programme for Prisons and Probation

HOPE - HOlistic radicalisation Prevention initiativE





Prison

Prison and probation services are primary agencies in fostering exit strategies that can help radicals disengage (renounce violence without giving up the ideology underpinning it) and de-radicalise (renounce both violence and the underlying ideology)

Probation



Portugal

- IPS Innovative Prison Systems
- DGRSP Portuguese Prison Service
- BSAFE LAB of UBI University Ministry of Justice (Attorney General's Office)
- Amadora City Hall, Portugal

Austria

- Salzburg University of Applied Sciences
- Salzburg Municipality

Belgium

- De Federale Overheidsdienst Justitie Le Service Public Federal Justice
- TNS Opinion AS
- Maks vzw Media Actie Kuregem Stad

Bulgaria

- General Directorate "Execution of Sentences"
- CSD Center for the Study of Democracy
- Bulgarian Association for Policy Evaluation

France

- University Charles De Gaulle Lille 3
- University Grenoble Alpes
- EFUS European Forum for Urban Security
- ONERA National Office for Aerospace Studies and Research
- CPDSI Center of Prevention Against Sectarian Drift Related to Islam
- Toulouse City Hall
- Nice Cote D'Azur Metropolis
- Profil Technology
- Vertical

Germany

 Bremen Senate of Justice and Constitution

Violence Prevention Network EV

Greece

- KEMEA Center for Security Studies
- University of Piraeus Research Center

Italy

- Ministry of Justice
- University of Brescia
- University of Calabria
- Agenfor International

Netherlands

- AVANS University of Applied Sciences Centre of Expertise for Public Safety and Criminal Justice
- EuroPris European Organisation of Prison and Correctional Services
- CEP Confederation of European Probation
- ICPA International Corrections and Prisons Association

Norway

- Directorate of Norwegian Correctional Service
- KRUS University College of the Norwegian Correctional Service

Romania

- National Prison Administration
- West University of Timisoara

Slovenia

• Ministry of Justice, Probation Administration

Spain

- Ministry of Interior
- University Rey Juan Carlos
- Madrid City Hall
- Fundacion Euroarabe de Altos **Estudios**

Tunisia

- National Commission for the Fight Against Terrorism
- Applied Social Science Forum

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Houses, Turkey

JUSTICE TRENDS //

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155N 2104-0153

PS INNOVATIVE PRISON SYSTEMS

JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION SISTEMAS DE JUSTICIA **EN TRANSICIÓN**


FEATURED INTERVIEW / ENTREVISTA DESTACADA Koen Geens

Minister of Justice, Belgium Ministro de Justicia, Bélgica

"Strategic planning and the development of the Belgian correctional system

Planificación estratégica y desarrollo del sistema correccional belga"





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36 articles from renown experts

35 countries covered

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EDITORIAL Prison as a last resort. The "Fata Morgana" of criminal justice systems?

EDITORIAL

// Editorial Issue #3, June 2018 By Pedro das Neves JUSTICE TRENDS Magazine Founder & DirectorCEO of IPS_Innovative Prison Systems The acknowledgement of the negative impact of imprisonment on individuals. families and communities led, over the last three decades, to the development of multiple reports, policy recommendations and initiatives advocating ...



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